We offer new sufficient conditions ensuring demand is downward sloping local to equilibrium. It follows that equilibrium is unique and stable in the sense that rising supply implies falling prices. In our setting, there are two goods, which we interpret as consumption in different time periods, and many impatience types. Agents have the same Bernoulli utility function, but the types differ arbitrarily in time preference. Our main result is that if endowments are identical and utility displays nonincreasing absolute risk aversion, then market demand is strictly downward sloping local to equilibrium. We discuss implications for the literature surrounding Diamond and Dybvig (1983) .
Introduction
When the aggregate endowment temporarily increases, will interest rates fall? Will discoveries of oil push down gas prices? The intuitive answer to these questions is yes. The logic is that since individual demand is normally downward sloping, if supply of a good increases, its price must fall to clear markets and maintain equilibrium. But this reasoning requires that aggregate, market demand inherit the properties of individual demand. If, for example, markets are complete and agents have identical homothetic utility functions, equilibrium prices are as if there were a representative agent with homothetic preferences. In this case, micro intuition extends to the macroeconomy. But what if we place less restrictive assumptions on individual preferences? Will market demand still look like the demand curve of a rational person?
The Sonnenschein (1972 , 1973 )-Mantel (1974 )-Debreu (1974 (SMD) results give a negative answer to this question (see Shafer and Sonnenschein, 1982 for a survey). They say that arbitrary continuous market excess demand functions can be generated by individuals with positive endowments and continuous, increasing, concave utility functions. In the case of Mantel (1976) , the utility functions can even be restricted to be homothetic. The striking implication is that strong assumptions about individuals (such as homotheticity) may yield wild market excess demand functions exhibiting, for example, multiple equilibria and thus equilibria with upward sloping demand. In this case, equilibrium may be unstable in the sense that increasing supply may lead to higher prices. In short, the SMD results show that concavity, continuity, and homotheticity are not sufficient for aggregate demand to behave like individual demand. See Toda and Walsh (2017) for examples of and sufficient conditions for unstable equilibria in Edgeworth box economies with identical homothetic or quadratic Bernoulli utility functions.
Yet theorists have uncovered many cases where competitive equilibrium is unique and thus stable, meaning that aggregate demand is downward sloping at least local to equilibrium. See Kehoe (1998) and Mas-Colell (1991) for surveys of the uniqueness literature. 1 For example, suppose agent i ∈ I has differentiable, increasing, concave utility u i (x) = J j =1 u i,j x j over J goods and a positive endowment of each good. If for all i ∈ I relative risk aversion is everywhere less than 1, −x j u i,j x j /u i,j x j < 1, then all excess demands functions are downward sloping, and the resulting equilibrium is unique and stable (see Mas-Colell et al., 1995) . By assuming collinear endowments, the result of Mitiushin and Polterovich (1978) weakens this condition to −xu /u < 4. Chipman (1974) and Eisenberg (1961) show that with collinear endowments and homothetic utilities, aggregation (which implies uniqueness) is possible with any risk aversion. However, as Kehoe (1998) observes, "useful conditions that guarantee uniqueness of equilibrium are very restrictive," involving, say, quantitative bounds on relative risk aversion. 2 Generally, as Kehoe (1998) continues, conditions sufficient for uniqueness have been difficult to translate into economic intuition without losing necessity. Furthermore, while there are many applied general equilibrium models for which we do not have uniqueness proofs (as in the infinite horizon macroeconomics literature), non-uniqueness examples are equally rare in some settings. Therefore, as Kehoe (1998) writes, "It may be the case that most applied models have unique 1 See Negishi (1962) , Arrow and Hurwicz (1958) , and Walras (1954) for early treatments of the topic of stability of competitive equilibrium.
2 Also, 4 is not a large value for relative risk aversion in the sense that many theoretical and empirical studies assume or estimate relative risk aversion to be well in excess of 4. See, for example, the meta-analysis of Havranek et al. (2015) . Note that while their study is about the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS), most of the papers they reference restrict risk aversion to be the reciprocal of the EIS.
equilibria." Indeed, it may be that relatively weak, easily verified sufficient conditions are simply unknown.
In this paper, we offer new sufficient conditions ensuring aggregate demand is downward sloping local to equilibrium. It follows that equilibrium is unique and locally stable. In our setting, there are two goods, which we interpret as consumption in different time periods, and I < ∞ impatience types. Agents have the same Bernoulli utility function u, but the types differ arbitrarily in time preference. That is, for arbitrary agent i utility is of the form u c i 1 + β i u c i 2 , where β i captures agent i's patience. Our main result (Proposition 1) is that when agents have identical, strictly positive endowments, if u displays nonincreasing absolute risk aversion then market demand is strictly downward sloping local to equilibrium. That is, when the interest rate rises, aggregate demand for the t = 2 good increases. It follows that (i) equilibrium is unique and (ii) increasing the supply of the t = 1 (t = 2) good leads to a fall (rise) in the equilibrium interest rate, in line with supply and demand intuition.
The assumption of nonincreasing absolute risk aversion is weak: at least since Arrow (1965) economists have almost universally held that increasing absolute risk aversion is an undesirable property because it implies investors spend less on risky assets as they become richer. Assuming identical endowments and two goods is more restrictive. However, this case is important because many papers have used it to study maturity mismatch and the role of government in managing liquidity. For example, the second and third periods of Diamond-Dybvig models (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) consist of different patience types with identical endowments. These papers, which include Jacklin (1987) , Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) , Farhi et al. (2009 ), Yared (2013 , and Geanakoplos and Walsh (2017) , show that the government can improve welfare by encouraging more short-term, liquid investment. Doing so increases welfare by pushing down the interest rate, which redistributes from patient to impatient types and hence mitigates a pecuniary externality. The key mechanism at play is rising liquidity leading to a fall in interest rates. In other words, proving inefficient liquidity provision in Diamond-Dybvig models requires stability of equilibrium. Geanakoplos and Walsh (2017) apply our Proposition 1 to show that in their generalized version of the Diamond-Dybvig model agents will always overinvest in high yielding but illiquid long-term assets and underinvest in short-term liquid assets.
Intuitively, why does nonincreasing absolute risk aversion rule out unstable equilibria and thus ensure uniqueness? Unstable equilibria arise when income effects are strong and positive in the aggregate, leading to upward sloping excess demand crossing 0. Absolute risk aversion −u /u is inversely proportional to the change in demand from increasing wealth. Thus, when absolute risk aversion is declining, the agent consuming the most is the most sensitive to changes in wealth. This implies that the aggregate income effect from a price rise is not positive. The most patient agents will buy the highest quantity of the t = 2 good and hence be net buyers of the t = 2 good, as well as the most sensitive to changes in wealth. Buyers face an income loss when the price increases, meaning the income effect reinforces the price effect for the most wealth sensitive consumers. Technically, we show that, given any price, nonincreasing absolute risk aversion implies that the derivative of consumption with respect to wealth is positively correlated with excess demand across agents, and thus that the average total income effect of a price increase is less than the total income effect of the "average" agent. 3 In equilibrium, market clearing implies the "average" agent must have zero excess demand, meaning his total income effect is zero. Therefore, equilibrium is essential for our result. Indeed, demand could be upward sloping away from equilibrium.
In Section 2, we exposit the model and prove our main propositions. In Section 3 we investigate the role of common endowments, compare our findings with the Chipman (1974 )-Eisenberg (1961 result, and allow for endowment heterogeneity in the case of homothetic utility.
Model and results
Consider an economy consisting of two time periods, t ∈ {1, 2}, and a unit mass of agents. There is a single consumption good in each time period. We normalize to 1 the price of the t = 1 good and define q to be the price of the t = 2 good. 4 There are I < ∞ impatience types indexed by i. Type i is distinguished by the parameter β i > 0. The t = 1 present value utility of impatience type i is
where c i t is the consumption of type i at t ∈ {1, 2}. Let π i be the fraction of i-types, and
That is, while the agents have identical Bernoulli utility functions, the economy exhibits arbitrary time preference heterogeneity. Agent i has endowment e i 1 , e i 2 0, and the agents are ordered by patience:
Stars denote equilibrium quantities. We assume that u is twice continuously differentiable, u > 0, u < 0, and lim x↓0 u (x) = ∞. Define a (·) ≡ −u (·) /u (·) to be the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion. We say that u satisfies declining absolute risk aversion (DARA) if a(c) ≥ a(c ) whenever c ≤ c . The budget set of an agent is
Definition 1 (Competitive equilibrium).
Competitive equilibrium consists of a price q * > 0 and consumption bundles c i * 1 , c i *
Define ω i (q) ≡ e i 1 +qe i 2 to be an agent's wealth at price q. The budget constraint is c i 1 +qc i 2 ≤ ω i (q) . Define c i t q, ω i to be type i's time t demand at price q and wealth ω i . u > 0, u < 0, and lim x↓0 u (x) = ∞ imply that the first order condition
4 For exposition we call the two goods consumption at t = 1 and t = 2, which means the relative price is the reciprocal of the interest rate, but our set up and analysis are identical to a static setting with two different goods. Mas-Colell et al., 1995) . 5 The goal is to show that when agents have identical endowments decreasing absolute risk aversion ensures market demand for the t = 2 good is downward sloping, local to any equilibrium: D (q * ) < 0. We break most of the proof down into four lemmas. Lemma 1 shows that for any price q > 0 demand is ordered according to patience. This is the first step in ordering total income effects.
Lemma 1 (Consumption Lemma). If e i
1 , e i 2 = (e 1 , e 2 ) ∀i, then
for any q > 0.
Proof. By lim x↓0 u (x) = ∞ and the other assumptions on u, the solution to each agent's optimization problem is interior, so the first order conditions (1) characterize the demand functions:
Since endowments are identical, ω i (q) = ω (q) = e 1 + qe 2 for all i ∈ I . Using the budget constraint and β i < β j for i < j, it follows that if i < j then The second lemma, which invokes Lemma 1, says that if DARA holds then the derivative of consumption with respect to wealth is ordered according to patience.
Lemma 2 (Income Effect Lemma). If e i
1 , e i 2 = (e 1 , e 2 ) ∀i and u satisfies DARA, then Proof. Suppressing superscripts for now and implicitly differentiating with respect to ω the first order condition of an arbitrary agent (Equation (1)), we get
.
Using the first order condition q = βu (c 2 ) /u (c 1 ) and the definition of a (x), we get
Since a is a decreasing function, the lemma follows immediately from the ordering of consumption (Lemma 1). 2
The upshot of Lemmas 1 and 2 is that the wealth effect term ∂c i 2 /∂ω (2) is monotonically increasing in c i 2 . By interpreting type i ∈ I as a random variable drawn with probability π i , we can write market excess demand as expected excess demand:
Thus, we can define the covariance between demand and the derivative of consumption with respect to wealth as
Because ∂c i 2 /∂ω is monotonically increasing in c i 2 , intuitively the two variables should have positive covariance (with respect to type). We prove this as the following lemma.
Lemma 3 (Covariance Lemma). If e i
1 , e i 2 = (e 1 , e 2 ) ∀i and u satisfies DARA, then for any q > 0
Proof. Fixing q > 0, let i ∈ I be a random variable drawn with probability π i , and define f (i) ≡ ∂c i 2 (q, ω(q))/∂ω and g(i) ≡ c i 2 (q, ω(q)) to be functions of the random variable. By Lemmas 1 and 2, f (i) and g(i) are monotonically increasing in i. Therefore, by the Chebyshev sum inequality (proved below),
The lemma then follows directly from the definition of covariance (Equation (4)).
To prove the Chebyshev sum inequality, let i be an i.i.
d. copy of the random variable i. For any draws of i and i , monotonicity implies (f (i) −f (i ))(g(i)
−g(i )) ≥ 0. Expanding the product, taking expectation, and using independence, we get
which immediately yields the inequality. 2
Intuitively, why does DARA yield this positive relationship between consumption and the strength of the income effect? Since the first order condition is
when an agent receives more wealth, optimization entails maintaining the ratio between t = 2 and t = 1 marginal utility. That is, the agent must adjust consumption so that the percentage increase in marginal utility is the same in both periods. Absolute risk aversion a = −u /u measures the percentage change in marginal utility per unit change in consumption. With declining absolute risk aversion, the most patient agents, who by Lemma 1 have high c 2 and low c 1 , must make a large adjustment to c 2 (and a small adjustment to c 1 ) to maintain the first order condition after receiving new wealth. Thus the covariance (across agents according to the probabilities π i ) between income effects and consumption is nonnegative.
What is the relevance of these lemmas for the slope of demand? As we will see in the proof of Proposition 1, − (c 2 − e 2 ) (∂c 2 /∂ω) is the total income effect in the Slutsky equation. Therefore, the Covariance Lemma (3) tells us, loosely, that the average income effect is bounded above by the income effect of the "average" agent:
When we impose the market clearing price, q * , average excess demand is 0, implying the market total income effect is negative:
Lemma 4 (Market Income Effect Lemma). If e i
1 , e i 2 = (e 1 , e 2 ) ∀i and u satisfies DARA, then
Proof. Since the agents have the same endowment, Lemma 1 implies c i 2 − e 2 is monotonically increasing in i. Therefore, we can repeat the proof of the Covariance Lemma (3) to get cov π ∂c i 2 /∂ω, c i 2 − e 2 ≥ 0, which is Equation (5). The lemma then immediately follows from the definition of covariance and market clearing at q = q * ,
It follows that demand is downward sloping local to any equilibrium q * :
Proposition 1 (Downward sloping demand). If e i
1 , e i 2 = (e 1 , e 2 ) ∀i and u satisfies DARA, then D (q * ) < 0.
Proof. For any agent i, the endowment economy Slutsky equation is
where h i is Hicksian demand. The first term is the substitution effect. It is strictly negative for all q > 0 by the compensated law of demand. The second term, the total income effect, may be positive or negative. However, at an equilibrium q * the Market Income Effect Lemma (4) says that the average income effect is negative. Therefore, D (q * ) < 0 follows immediately from averaging dc i 2 /dq across agents and imposing market clearing. More formally, implicitly differentiating the first order condition of an agent (1) we get
Thus,
By Lemma 4, we have
In summary, demand is downward sloping local to equilibrium. Separability and u > 0, u < 0 ensure the market substitution effect is negative. Thus, whether intuitive supply and demand statics apply depends on the market's total income effect. DARA puts an upper bound on this total market income effect: the buyer income effect, which has the "correct" sign, has the greatest weight in aggregation. This is because DARA means buyers have insensitive marginal utility and must make large adjustments to equate marginal utility across goods when optimizing. Market clearing means the upper bound is zero. 6 Proposition 1 implies a unique equilibrium exists.
Proposition 2 (Uniqueness). If e i
1 , e i 2 = (e 1 , e 2 ) ∀i and u satisfies DARA, then there is a unique equilibrium.
Since the budget constraint is q (c 2 − e 2 ) = e 1 − c 1 , by applying the same argument to c 1 and 1/q we can find q such that z (q) < 0 if q ≥ q. Therefore, by the intermediate value theorem, we can find q * ∈ q, q such that z (q * ) = 0. That is, an equilibrium exists. Let Q * denote the set of 6 Note that Proposition 1 still holds with a continuum of types β(i) and measure π on subsets of [0, 1]. In this case, Lemmas 1 and 2 are unchanged since they don't depend on agent measure. The interpretation of aggregation as expectation (Equation (3) equilibrium prices, and let q * = inf Q * . Because demand is continuous and z (q) > 0 if q ≤ q, q * > q exists and is an equilibrium. Thus, there is no equilibrium to the left of q * by definition.
By Proposition 1, D q * < 0, so if there is an equilibrium to the right of q * , it must satisfy D ≥ 0 by the continuity of D. This would contradict Proposition 1, so q * constitutes the unique equilibrium. See Fig. 1. 2 To analyze aggregate stability, let z (q; e 1 , e 2 ) denote market excess demand for the t = 2 good at price q and the common endowment (e 1 , e 2 ). Also, let Q (e 1 , e 2 ) denote the equilibrium price corresponding to endowment (e 1 , e 2 ). The equilibrium price Q is continuously differentiable by the implicit function theorem, as demand is continuously differentiable. Our final result shows that increasing the supply of the t = 1 (t = 2) good leads to a fall (rise) in the equilibrium interest rate, in line with supply and demand intuition. Q (e 1 , e 2 ) < 0, as we see graphically in Fig. 1. 2 
Proposition 3 (Stability

Extensions
We now further discuss our key assumptions. Imposing DARA and identical Bernoulli utilities is standard in applied settings. Assuming common endowments seems more restrictive, although our framework does correspond to the second and third periods of Diamond-Dybvig models. Furthermore, Toda and Walsh (2017) show that with quadratic utility, which violates DARA, there can be multiple equilibria in this class of economies, even with common endowments. However, Proposition 4 (which follows from the Chipman (1974 )-Eisenberg (1961 result) begs the question, can we allow for some endowment heterogeneity?
Proposition 4 (Chipman (1974 )-Eisenberg (1961 ). Suppose for some {α i } ∈ R I ++ satisfying
, it follows that D (q * ) < 0, and equilibrium is unique and stable.
Proof. In this constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) subcase of DARA, we have demand in closed-form:
Additionally, a(c) = γ /c, so from (6) and (7) Equation (2) becomes
Finally, the market income effect is
where S = I i=1 π i ω i (q) and π i ≡ π i ω i (q)/S. Since c i 2 /ω i (q) and ∂c i 2 /∂ω have the same order with respect to i (by Equations (7) and (8)) and since e i 2 /ω i (q) does not depend on i (by endowment collinearity), the proof of Proposition 1 goes though, except with the measure π in place of π . Proofs of uniqueness and stability then proceed as above. 2
That is, in the CRRA subcase of DARA, uniqueness and stability hold provided endowments are collinear. 7 Why is this the case? As we see in the proof of Proposition 4, CRRA utility implies wealth enters demand functions linearly, which means we can pull individual wealth from the income effect terms. Individual wealth effectively changes the agents' measures (which were irrelevant for our propositions), but the resulting economy is as if agents' endowments were identical. Endowment collinearity means that individual wealth can also be pulled from e i 2 , which is important since the income effect is about excess demand.
Without CRRA utility, endowment collinearity does not help in our proofs: with an arbitrary wealth distribution, it is not clear how to order consumption and wealth partials by type, which is the key step in bounding the market income effect (as we see in Equation (8), with CRRA utility the ordering of wealth partials by type holds for any wealth distribution). 8 This suggests that downward sloping market demand still holds provided there isn't "too much" heterogeneity, that is, as long as endowments are similar enough to ensure positive covariance (across types) between excess demand and income effect strength.
We conjecture that what constitutes "too much" heterogeneity depends on the particular Bernoulli utility and equilibrium price and that for general DARA preferences there is no condition on β's and endowments alone ensuring downward sloping demand: patient agents must be richer to consume more of good 2, but their endowment must be tilted to good 1 so that they have higher t = 2 excess demand. On the other hand, if they are too rich, they may consume a lot of good 1, pushing down their wealth partial via the a(c 1 ) term in Equation (2). We suspect that the balance of these three effects depends on u and q * , for which there is no closed-form expression. However, with CRRA utility we are able to drop endowment collinearity and get downward sloping demand with a cross restriction on patience and endowments. The condition is that the endowments of patient agents must be tilted toward good 1. is declining in patience. By Equations (7) and (8) 
